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Colorado water law developed in response to populist efforts of
miners and farmers concerned that wealthy easterners would corner
limited water resources to the exclusion of actual water users settling in
Colorado. Colorado thus established property rights based on a water
allocation and administration system called the "Colorado Doctrine,"
which encourages "multiple use of a finite resource for beneficial purposes."' The Colorado Doctrine states that:
(1) water is a public resource, dedicated to beneficial use by public
agencies and private persons as prescribed by law; (2) the right to use
water includes the right to cross the lands of others so that water can
be placed into or withdrawn from natural water-bearing formations or
to convey water across others' property; and (3) the natural waterbearing formations may be used for the transport and retention of
appropriated water.

t The authors would like to thank Stephen H. Leonhardt for his guidance in
drafting this article and recognize his leading role in the High Plains litigation described herein.
1. High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710,
718-19 (Colo. 2005); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP,
45 P.3d 693, 706 (Colo. 2002).
2. High Plains,120 P.3d at 718.
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The anti-speculation doctrine provides that an appropriator cannot
obtain a water right decree without a demonstrated ability to actually
use the water at a specified place. This doctrine developed from the
seeds of the Colorado Doctrine to prevent wealthy speculators from
monopolizing the development of Colorado's water resources.! Although the demands on this scarce resource have changed since the
earliest settlement of Colorado, the anti-speculation doctrine continues to assure that water rights holders put the state's resources to actual use. More and more, municipal users, rather than farmers and
miners, drive the continued development of Colorado water law. Notably, this rapidly increasing municipal water demand is occurring at a
time when many of Colorado's rivers, the South Platte and Arkansas in
particular, are over-appropriated. Securing reliable year-round supplies for municipal customers under these conditions presents unique
and unprecedented challenges for municipal water suppliers.
Many municipalities address these challenges by purchasing and
changing agricultural water rights to satisfy municipal demand. The
adjudication of these often complicated changes has forced the application of existing tenets of Colorado water law to new circumstances,
forcing the evolution of Colorado water law. The anti-speculation doctrine is one of these well-established tenants. The doctrine requires
demonstration of an actual plan and intent to place water to beneficial,
and not speculative, use as a condition for adjudication of a water
right. Yet, until High Plains, the obligation of a holder of an absolute
water right to demonstrate, as part of an application to change the use
of the water right, a present intent to put the changed water right to a
specific beneficial use remained unanswered. In its High Plains decision, the Colorado Supreme Court confirmed that the anti-speculation
doctrine is a fundamental principle of Colorado water law that must
apply to changes of absolute water rights.4
In examining the High Plainsdecision, this article first discusses the
history of the anti-speculation doctrine. Part II analyzes the High Plains
decision in the context of the Arkansas River Basin. Part III considers
the tenets of Colorado water law that support applying the antispeculation doctrine to change cases. The article concludes with a
discussion of the impacts of the High Plains decision on future applications for changes of water rights.

3.
4.

Id. at 719 n.3.
Id. at 714.
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I. THE ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE: A FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF COLORADO WATER LAW
The anti-speculation doctrine has its origins in Section 5, Article
XVI of the Colorado Constitution, which declares that all unappropriated water within Colorado is "the property of the public," and reserves
the use of such water for "the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided."5 As interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, Section 5 reserves the waters of the state for the public,
and it protects the public interest by requiring actual use of the water
by appropriators.! The anti-speculation doctrine developed to ensure
that new appropriations of water are not speculative. The concept is so
essential to Colorado water law that courts and lawmakers have applied
it to a variety of circumstances.
A. The Anti-Speculation Doctrine Developed From the Requirement
to Beneficially Use Water
Colorado water law has long recognized water rights based primarily on the diversion and beneficial use of water.7 This simple requirement of use has far-reaching effects. For instance, actual use of water
must precede adjudication of an absolute water right.8 Similarly, a
conditional water right can exist only if the applicant demonstrates
that it can and will use the water.9 Moreover, an owner of a conditional
water right must periodically return to water court to demonstrate diligent pursuit of the appropriation and show it still can and will use the
water."9 More than simple administrative red tape, these requirements
protect against speculative hoarding of water rights.1

5.

6.

§ 5; High Plains,120 P.3d. at 720.
City & County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992,
COLO. CONST. ART. XVI,

1008-09 (Colo. 1954); People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (reaffirm-

ing section 5 "was primarily intended to preserve the historical appropriation system of
water rights upon which the irrigation economy in Colorado was founded, rather than

to assure public access to waters for purposes other than appropriation").
7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (2005); see, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches
Prop. Owners Ass'n. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53-54 (Colo. 1999);Thomas v. Guiraud, 6
Colo. 530, 532 (1883).
8. See § 37-92-103(3) (a), (12); Shirola v. Turkey Canon Ranch LLC, 937 P.2d 739,
748 (Colo. 1997).
9. § 37-92-305(9)(b).
10. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-301(4)(a)(I), -305(9)(b); Dallas Creek Water Co. v.
Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36-37, 42-43 (Colo. 1997).
11. See Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 968 (Colo. 1892) (noting the

can and will doctrine prevents companies from obtaining a monopoly and charging
exorbitant rates for the use of water); see also New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 40 P.
989, 992 (Colo. 1895).
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The requirement of actual beneficial use prevents hoarding of water rights for financial gain.'2 For instance, City and County of Denver v.
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, presented a situation in
which several engineers platted various transmountain diversions and
attempted to sell the project to municipalities along the Front Range."
Ultimately, Colorado Springs purchased the project, and sought adjudication of water rights for the project. Colorado Springs claimed the
engineering work of the entrepreneurs from which it purchased the
project constituted diligent efforts to appropriate a water right and
justified adjudication of an appropriation date relating back to the
beginning of that work." The court rejected the idea that:
mere speculators, not intending themselves to appropriate and carry
water to a beneficial use or representing others so intending, can by
survey, plat and token construction compel subsequent bona fide appropriators to pay them tribute by purchasing their claims in order to
acquire a right guaranteed them by our Constitution."
The court determined that one who has no intent to apply the water to beneficial use cannot claim rights against one who subsequently
makes a good faith appropriation.'6 Because Colorado Springs' predecessors were "promoters and speculators," their efforts fell short of the
diligence toward an appropriation required to establish a conditional
water right.'"
As the court later stated in a subsequent ruling,
"[s] peculation on the market, or sale expectancy, is wholly foreign to
the principle of keeping life in a proprietary right."'8
B. The Colorado Constitution Guarantees a Right to Appropriate but
Not to Speculate
Twenty-five years after its City & County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District decision, the court further clarified the
anti-speculation doctrine in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
Vidler Tunnel Water Co." There, the court affirmed that the constitution
guarantees "a right to appropriate, not a right to speculate." 2° This decision confirmed that the anti-speculation doctrine applies to all new
appropriations.
12.

See Combs, 28 P. at 968.

13. City & County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992,
996-97, 1006 (Colo. 1954).
14. Id. at 1007-08.

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1008.
Id.

18.
19.

Knapp v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 279 P.2d 420, 427 (Colo. 1955).
594 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979).
Id at 568 (emphasis added).

20.
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Vidler Tunnel Water Company ("Vidler") was a Colorado corporation that owned various water rights and a transmountain diversion
tunnel.' Vidler was making plans to begin a reservoir project known as
the Sheephorn Project." Vidler planned to use some of the stored water to irrigate lands it owned and to sell the remainder of the stored
water to municipalities, including the City of Golden to which Vidler
sold an option to purchase storage space,. 3 Vidler presented evidence
of preliminary discussions with Denver, Aurora, Westminster, Grand
County, and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District regarding the potential purchase of such water rights for municipal and
other uses.2" At the time of its application, however, it had no contracts
with any of those entities.
The court held that "mere negotiations with other municipalities
clearly do not rise to the level of definite commitment for use required
to prove the intent" necessary to obtain a conditional water right. 6
Colorado's constitution allows citizens to appropriate for actual use,
not to obtain a profit. 7 Colorado does not give anyone the right to
reserve water rights "for the anticipated future use of others not in privity of contract, or in any agency relationship, with the developer regarding that use."" Recognizing that such conditional decrees would
encourage those with monetary resources to monopolize water for personal profit rather than for beneficial use, the Colorado Supreme
Court held the conditional decree was valid only to the extent that
Vidler proved it would use the water to irrigate its own fields.' Vidler
could not claim further rights based on either the option granted to
Golden or those discussions it had with municipalities to whom it
hoped eventually to sell the water.'
C. Codification of the Anti-Speculation Doctrine
Vidler rang so true it prompted legislative action to codify the antispeculation doctrine."
In 1979, the Colorado General Assembly
amended the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969 ("Act") to include the anti-speculation doctrine in the definition
of "appropriation," stating "no appropriation of water, either absolute
21. Id. at 567.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 568.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 568-69.
30. Id. at 568.
31. 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws page no. 1368; In re Bd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d
952, 959-60 (Colo. 1995).
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or conditional, shall be held to occur when the proposed appropriation is based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative
rights to persons not parties to the proposed appropriation."" This
new definition codified Vidler's bar to speculative hoarding of water
rights.
The new definition also specified circumstances constituting speculation, including when the "purported appropriator" lacks: (1) a right,
or reasonable expectation of obtaining a right, to use the lands or facilities to be served by the appropriation; or (2) "a specific plan and
intent to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses."" If either circumstance exists, the water court cannot recognize an appropriation.'
D. New Appropriations of Conditional Water Rights Provided the Context for Early Development of the Anti-Speculation Doctrine
As evidenced by Denver and Vidler, the anti-speculation doctrine initially developed through attempted appropriations of new conditional
water rights. A conditional water right guarantees its owner a place in
the priority system of Colorado water rights so long as the owner implements the appropriation within a reasonable amount of time.' A
conditional water right inherently involves uncertainties about future
development of the right. Thus, to obtain a conditional water right,
the applicant must demonstrate that it has the ability, intent and commitment to pursue and complete the appropriation.' This prevents
the hoarding of water rights by speculators and avoids needless expenditure of resources on speculative claims for conditional rights. Actual intent and ability to use the water are so important that an owner
of a conditional water right must periodically (every six years) return to
water court to prove continuing efforts to place the water to use and
the ability to do so." Even in these periodic diligence proceedings,
applicants must continue to satisfy the anti-speculation doctrine be-

32. 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws page no. 1368 (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(3) (a)).
33. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (2005).
34. Id.
35. § 37-92-103(6); Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands L.P., 929
P.2d 718, 723 (Colo. 1996).
36. § 37-92-305(9) (b) (2005); FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d
837, 840 (Colo. 1990) (must have access to lands served).
37. See Vought v. Stucker Mesa Domestic Pipeline Co., 76 P.3d 906, 913-14 (Colo.
2003); See also In re Bd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952, 960 (Colo. 1995) ("can and
will" test intended to deny "recognition of claims for conditional water rights that have
no substantial probability of maturing into completed appropriations").
38. § 37-92-301(4); Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36-37, 42-43 (Colo.
1997).
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cause "a conditional right, or some portion of that right, may become
speculative over time. " '
E. The Anti-Speculation Doctrine Extended Beyond Conditional Water Rights
While applications for conditional water rights provided the context for early development of the anti-speculation doctrine, nothing
has limited its application to conditional water rights. More recently,
the Colorado Supreme Court has applied the anti-speculation doctrine
to designated groundwater regulated by the Colorado Groundwater
Management Act. Although a modified prior appropriation system
governs designated groundwater and prior appropriation does not
apply at all to nontributary groundwater, beneficial use of those rights,
and thus the anti-speculation doctrine, are imperative to developing
those rights.
Only in the relatively recent history of Colorado has development
of deep groundwater been cost effective. Consesquently, the law governing such water has developed relatively recently. The Ground Water Management Act established the Ground Water Commission
("Commission") and infused it with the authority to approve withdrawals of groundwater from designated groundwater basins.' That
authority is guided, in part, by the anti-speculation.
In Jaeger v. Colorado Ground Water Commission, the Commission denied the applicant's request for a right to withdraw groundwater from
an aquifer because, the Commission found, "the applicant hopes to sell
the water in the future, but presently has no contractual commitment(s) for the purchase of the water for a beneficial use."" On appeal, the applicant argued the Ground Water Management Act requires no showing of beneficial use of the water, but compels issuance
of a permit based only upon consideration of the criteria set forth in
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-90-107(4).4' The court recognizing that Section
37-90-107 requires applicants to identify a proposed beneficial use,
the location of use, the owners of such locations, and the amount of
water, 4 found that the Commission correctly denied the permit be-

39. Mun. Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., 990 P.2d
701, 709 (Colo. 1999).
40. §§ 37-90-101,-103(6).
41. Jaeger v. Colo. Groundwater Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515, 517 (Colo. 1987).
42. Id. at 517-18; § 37-90-107(4) states:
If after [a] hearing it appears that there are no unappropriated waters in the
designated source or that the proposed appropriation would unreasonably
impair existing water rights from such source or would create unreasonable
waste, the application shall be denied; otherwise it shall be granted in accordance with subsection (3) of this section.
43. Jaeger, 746 P.2d at 521.
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cause, without any plan or contract for actual use of the water, the
withdrawal violated the anti-speculation doctrine."
In 2003, the court applied the doctrine to Commission consideration of an application for Denver Basin designated groundwater, even
though ownership of overlying land, not prior appropriation, established the right to use such water.45 As the court stated, "[t]o suggest
that the anti-speculation doctrine does not apply to these waters because use is limited to overlying owners of land ... disregards the goal
of conservation and the public nature of this resource."46 Denver Basin
groundwater is "a finite, exhaustible public resource" that should not
be tied up by speculators." The court therefore held the rationale behind Vidler and Jaeger applies equally to Ground Water Commission
determinations regarding Denver Basin designated groundwater."
Recently, the court held that water courts cannot apply the antispeculation doctrine to an application for adjudication of nontributary
groundwater rights, but it did not exempt such water rights from application of the doctrine.49 In East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District v. Rangeview Metropolitan District, the court concluded that
water courts cannot consider the anti-speculation doctrine when issuing a decree for nontributary groundwater outside a designated
ground water basin.' The court reached this conclusion because the
legislature, which holds plenary power over nontributary groundwater,
has limited water court jurisdiction over nontributary groundwater.'
By statute, water courts must decree nontributary groundwater rights
Nonetheless, the
without regard for immediate plans for use."
Groundwater Management Act requires beneficial use of nontributary
groundwater,5 but delegates authority for evaluating beneficial use to
the exclusive discretion of the State Engineer.' While an appropriator
of nontributary groundwater can obtain a decree without demonstrating any beneficial use for the water, it cannot obtain a well permit
without demonstrating an actual beneficial use to the State Engineer.55
44. Id. at 523.
45. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 78 (Colo. 2003); The geographical extent of this basin is more particularly
described in Rule 4(A) (10) of The Denver Basin Rules. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-6

(1985).
46. N. Kiowa-Bijou, 77 P.3d at 80.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109
P.3d. 154, 158 (Colo. 2005).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 158.
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(11) (2005); § 37-90-137(6).
53. § 37-90-102(2).
54. Cherry Creek, 109 P.3d at 158.
55. § 37-90-137(4); Cherry Creek, 109 P.3d at 158.
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Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
every type of water right requires actual beneficial use of the water and
is subject to the anti-speculation doctrine.
F. Public Entities May Plan for Future Growth Without Violating the
Anti-Speculation Doctrine
While private businesses cannot hoard water to maximize profits,
the law allows municipalities and other public entities to plan for future growth and water demands. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(3) (a)
authorizes a public entity to provide for its reasonably anticipated future needs without violating the anti-speculation doctrine." Like the
anti-speculation doctrine itself, this so-called "great and growing cities"
doctrine originated at common law.
In City and County of Denver v. Sheriff the court recognized that "it is
not speculation but the highest prudence on the part of the city to obtain appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs resulting from a
normal increase in population within a reasonable period of time.""
Similarly, in City and County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, the court recognized that "when appropriations are
sought by a growing city, regard should be given to its reasonably anticipated requirements."5 8
When the Colorado General Assembly modified the definition of
appropriation, codifying the anti-speculation doctrine described in
Vidler, it also recognized the need for "governmental agencies," including agencies responsible for supplying water to individual users, to
have the flexibility to plan for future water needs.' So far, the court
has only examined the governmental agency exception to the antispeculation doctrine with respect to a municipality.'
Nonetheless,
given the express statutory language allowing a "government agency"
to appropriate water for its constituents and the policy behind the municipal planning exception, the law will likely allow at least some governmental agencies with quasi-municipal powers, including the right to

56. § 37-92-103(3) (a); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 38-39
(Colo. 1996).
57. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1939).
58. City & County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 997
(Colo. 1954); Indeed, the Court in High Plains recognized this exception by acknowledging that High Plains' application might not have been speculative if it had identified a "municipal or quasi-municipal entity with which High Plains has an agreement
for actual beneficial use of the water." High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 721 (Colo. 2005).
59. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 38; § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I).
60. See, e.g., Thornton, 926 P.2d at 38 ("[A] city may appropriate water for its future
needs without violating the prohibition on speculation so long as the amount of the
appropriation is in line with the city's 'reasonably anticipated requirements'").
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provide public water service, to use this exception to plan for their citizens' future water needs.
II. THE HIGH PLAINS DECISION APPLIED THE ANTISPECULATION DOCTRINE TO APPLICATIONS FOR CHANGES
OF WATER RIGHTS
In High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District' the applicants, all private investors, attempted to change agricultural water rights in the Arkansas River, historically used for irrigation in southeastern Colorado, to allow any possible use of the water
virtually anywhere in eastern Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court
held that the anti-speculation doctrine applies to changes of water
rights.63 Accordingly, any change applicant must demonstrate it will
place the changed water right to a specific beneficial use at a specified
location. Because High Plains could not make such a showing, the
court upheld dismissal of the applications as speculative.
A. As Population in the Arkansas River Basin Has Increased, So Has
the Demand for Water, Making Agricultural Water Rights More
Valuable
When settlers first populated the Arkansas River Basin, mining was
the primary industry in the upper basin and agriculture sustained the
lower basin. Like much of the rest of the state, today the population in
the Arkansas Valley is growing, but that population is increasingly concentrated in cities. Indeed, the population in the Arkansas River Basin
grew from 299,494 in 1950 to 807,621 in 2000.' Most of this growth
occurred in Colorado Springs and, to a lesser extent, in the Pueblo
61.

Undoubtedly, though, the function of each such entity will drive the court's

decision. For example, the United Water and Sanitation District is a special district
formed in Elbert County. However, it has a district boundary of one acre, with no
houses or buildings. The District does not supply water to its own service area, rather it
acquires water rights and sells them to other water providers in Colorado. David Olinger & Chuck Plunkett, Liquid Assets - Turning Water into Gold, THE DENVER POST, No-

vember 21, 2005 at Al. While the United Water and Sanitation District is technically a
government agency, it may be nothing more than a device established by private investors to skirt the anti-speculation doctrine. The District has a handful of applications
pending in Water Division 1. Almost certainly, the Court soon will be faced with decid-

ing for what purpose government agencies may avail themselves of the "great and
growing cities" doctrine.
62.

High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710

(Colo. 2005).
63. Id. at 714.
64. Jim Westkott, Population Change in Colorado's River Basins: A Brief History from
1950 to 2000 and Forecasts from 2000 to 2030, in DROUGHT AND WATER SUPPLY
ASSESSMENTS, 3 tbl.4-2 (Colorado Water Conservation Board, eds. 2004), available at

http://cwcb.state.co.us/owc/DroughtWater/html/chapterO4.html.
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area. In contrast, the population of the eastern plains declined during
the same period.' By 2030, the population of the Arkansas Valley is
projected to reach 1,242,000, with most of the growth continuing to
occur in Colorado Springs and Pueblo."
The Arkansas River itself is over-appropriated. 7 Given the unavailability of new appropriations, municipalities have purchased water
rights from farmers and changed the use of those rights from irrigation
to municipal uses.' In 1996, the Colorado State Engineer recorded
water usage of 1,839,001 acre-feet for irrigation in the Arkansas Valley
and 156,399 acre-feet for municipal purposes.' By 2004, 1,113,287
acre-feet were used for irrigation purposes and 170,631 acre-feet were
used for municipal purposes.' This represents an almost 40 percent
decrease in agricultural usage over 8 years with a corresponding 9 percent increase in municipal usage.
As the population grows and the market for agricultural products
declines, the economic justification for selling agricultural water becomes stronger. The value of agricultural water is increasing as municipal demands increase. 7' In many cases, the most profitable use of
an agricultural water right is to sell the right for municipal uses.72 Such
changes, however, are not without economic impacts to agricultural
communities. To mitigate these impacts, the legislature has required
change applicants to revegetate formerly irrigated lands and make
economic mitigation payments to agricultural communities. 7'
Given the lack of new water to appropriate, and increasing demand, most issues with respect to potential speculation are likely to
occur in these changes of water rights cases as opposed to new appropriations. High Plains and others have been cognizant of this change
in economic conditions and have purchased irrigation water rights,
hoping to sell those rights to urban areas located not only in the Arkansas Basin but throughout the front range.

65.
66.
67.
Water
68.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
Shirola v. Turkey Canon Ranch LLC, 937 P.2d 739, 745 (Colo. 1997); Se. Colo.
Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 716 (Colo. 1984).
Chris Woodka, We Have Issues: Arkansas Valley Buffeted by Water Concerns, THE
PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN, January 3, 2006.
69. Cumulative Yearly Statistics of the Colorado Division of Water Resources 2000,
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/cumulative/cume-rpt_2000.pdf.
70. Cumulative Yearly Statistics of the Colorado Division of Water Resources 2004,
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/cumulative/CYS_rpt_2004.pdf.
71. DAVID BEAUJON, FINDING WATER FOR ONE MILLION NEW RESIDENTS, COLORADO
LEGISLATrVE COUNCIL STAFF ISSUE BRIEF,
No. 99-5 (1999), available at
http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/1999/research/issuebrf99-5.htm.
72. Id.
73.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(4.5) (2005).
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B. The Facts of the High PlainsCase
In two consolidated applications for changes to water rights, High
Plains claimed ownership or control of approximately 30% of the outstanding shares of the Fort Lyon Canal Company ("Fort Lyon").' High
Plains sought to change its Fort Lyon shares from irrigation and other
decreed uses in the lower Arkansas River Valley to any beneficial use,
including over fifty identified potential uses, in any location within
twenty-eight Colorado counties." Except for continued irrigation of
historically irrigated lands, High Plains did not specify the type of use,
any particular location of use, any particular plan for use of any of the
alternate points of diversion or storage, nor any person who would use
the water.
After rereferal of the cases, High Plains filed a motion for determination of a question of law, seeking a ruling that the anti-speculation
doctrine only applied to new appropriations and not to changes of
absolute water rights."6 After conducting limited discovery confirming
that High Plains lacked any specific plan for use of the water, the
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District and other objectors
filed a motion for summary judgment asking the water court to dismiss
High Plains' applications because they violated the anti-speculation
doctrine. The water court granted the objectors' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed High Plains' applications, finding that "Applicants' plan is so expansive and nebulous that it is impossible for
other holders of water rights to determine whether they will be injured," and because the applications were speculative in nature. 7 On
appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the dismissal."
C. To Change the Use of the Water Right, an Applicant Must Prove an
Actual Beneficial Use
High Plains sought to change the use of its Fort Lyon shares from
historical agricultural irrigation uses to a myriad of new uses. The
"bundle of sticks" comprising a water right includes the ability to
change the point of diversion and the nature of the use of the water.'
A "change of water right" includes "a change in the type, place, or time
of use, a change in the point of diversion, a change from a fixed point
of diversion to alternate or supplemental points of diversion.... [or] a
74. High Plains, 120 P.3d at 714-15; The Fort Lyon Canal Company is a mutual
ditch company in southeastern Colorado. Fort Lyon has a series of canals that extend
over 150 miles, as well as an extensive reservoir system. Id. at 714.
75. Id. at 715.
76. Id. at 716.
77. Id. at 716.
78. Id. at 714.
79. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 245 (Colo.
2002); Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Colo. 1980).
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change in the means of diversion.' ' The right to make such changes,
however, is not absolute, and an applicant for a change of water rights
must satisfy several standards that protect other water users.
Change proceedings are designed to provide notice and the opportunity for potentially affected water rights holders to participate in the
proceedings in order to protect their rights from injury."' Any application for a change of water rights must describe the water right sought
to be changed (including source and amount), the historic use of that
water right, as well as the place and nature of the new use. " The water
clerk then publishes a summary of the application called a resume in
local newspapers and circulates it to any water user who so requests."
The water court cannot grant a change of a water right if the
change injures owners of other vested water rights."4 If it appears such
injury is possible, the applicant must propose terms and conditions to
prevent the injury." These terms and conditions may include limitations on the proposed use of the water, relinquishment of part of the
historic decree if such relinquishment is necessary to prevent enlargement of the water right, and limiting the changed use to certain times
of the year. "
A change proceeding cannot enlarge a water right. 7 Implied in
every decree are limitations: (1) "to an amount sufficient for the purpose for which the appropriation was made" without waste; and (2) "in
quantity by the historical use at the original decreed point of diversion. " ' The water available for change cannot exceed the historic use
at the original point of diversion. 8 To ensure that an appropriator
does not enlarge its water rights, water courtsl examine the pattern of
historic diversions and beneficial consumptive use of the water under
the decreed right at its place of use." Such careful examination of historical use protects other users against injury caused by the change,
and preserves the integrity of the prior appropriation system.

80. § 37-92-103(5).
81. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1158 (Colo. 2001)
(citing Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 197
(Colo. 1999)); Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 55
(Colo. 1999).
82. § 37-92-302(2) (a).
83. § 37-92-302(3)(b)
84. § 37-92-305(3).
85. Id.
86. § 37-92-305(4).
87. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 246 (Colo.
2002).
88. Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Colo. 1988).
89. Id. at 1223; Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371-72 (Colo. 1980).
90. Williams v. Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. (In re Midway Ranches),
938 P.2d 515, 521 (Colo. 1997).
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The need for security and predictability in the prior appropriation
system limits the ability of water rights holders to change their rights.9'
The right to change the use of a water right promotes efficient use of
water as needs change over time, but such new uses must be "consistent with the administration of decreed water rights."' Similarly, the
water judge cannot grant an application for a change of water right if it
will injuriously affect the rights of other water users." Thus, change
decrees must provide finality and certainty in the administration of the
changed right to avoid injury. Such decrees also must adhere to standards for decreed water rights, including non-speculative beneficial
use.
In reviewing the water court's dismissal of the High Plains Applications, the court first looked to the Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969 ("Act"), examining the definition of
"change of water right" and, more fundamentally, the meaning of "water right," "appropriation," and "beneficial use."' While water rights
owners may adjudicate a "change in the type, place, or time of use, a
change in the point of diversion . . . or any combination of such

changes,"95 every "water right" depends both upon appropriation and
beneficial use for its existence.' The court found that Colorado water
law requires every applicant to demonstrate a plan and intent to "put a
specific amount of ... water to an actual beneficial use at an identified
location within Colorado."97 An applicant must satisfy this standard
regardless of whether it seeks a conditional water right, an absolute
water right, or a change of water rights.'
The concept of a change of water rights recognizes that the "priority of the existing right can be operated for new uses at different locations under conditions necessary to maintain the appropriation without injury to other decreed appropriations."' An owner of a water
right cannot change its use without approval by the water court.
Rather, the owner must apply to the water court for a change decree
and confirm that a valid appropriation will continue with the new uses
and places of diversion." Nothing in the Act authorizes recognition of
91.

Id.

92. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consolidated Mutual Water Co., 33 P.3d
799, 806 (Colo. 2001).
93. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (2005); Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v.
City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 246 (Colo. 2002); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co.,

926 P.2d 1, 80 (Colo. 1996).
94. High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710,
717-18 (Colo. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3), -103(4), -103(5), -103(12) (2005).
95.
§ 37-92-103(5).

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

High Plains,120 P.3d at 718.
Id.
Id.
Id.
High Plains,120 P.3d at 718-19.
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a water right without an appropriation for an actual beneficial use,
even upon a change application.''
An application for a change of a water right reopens the absolute
decree for consideration of a new plan and intent for use of the waConsequently, like an applicant for a new water right, the
ter.
"change applicant must show a legally vested interest in the land to be
served by the change of use and a specific plan and intent to use the
water for specific purposes.""'° The applicant must sufficiently describe
the actual beneficial use at an identified location or locations before a
court can issue a decree for a change of the water right."
D. High Plains Could Not Demonstrate an Actual Plan or Intent to
Use Water as Proposed in its Applications
In contrast to other change applications granted by water courts
and upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court, High Plains was not a
public entity, nor did it have a contract for an actual beneficial use of
the changed water rights."°5 While High Plains had discussed selling
some of the changed water rights to users in fourteen of the twentyeight counties listed in the application, it had no contracts for use of
the water other than for irrigation of the historically irrigated fields."°
Accordingly, the court held:
A guess that a transferred priority might eventually be put to beneficial use is not what the Colorado Constitution or the General Assembly envisioned as the triggering predicate for continuing an appro-

priation under a change of water right decree. The change application process is intended to facilitate transfers that are calculated to result in a continued application of the appropriated water to specified
debeneficial uses at different identified locations from the current
07
rights.
water
other
to
injury
prevent
to
conditions
under
cree
Allowing a change application to proceed based on such a guess
would impose an unnecessary burden both on the state court system
and other water users. Thus, the supreme court upheld the water
court's dismissal of High Plains' Applications as speculative. 8
101.

Id. at 719.

102.

Id. at 720.

103.

Id.

104.

Id. at 720-21.

This requirement may be satisfied by demonstration that the

applicant is a governmental agency who may take advantage of the "great and growing
cities" doctrine, or that the applicant has an agreement to provide water to an entity or
land to be served by the changed water right. Id. at 720.
105. Id. at 721.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 724.
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M. APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-SPECUILATION DOCTRINE TO
CHANGE CASES SUPPORTS THE COLORADO DOCTRINE
The fundamental tenets of Colorado water law support applying
the anti-speculation doctrine to changes of water rights in addition to
new appropriations of water rights. Application of the anti-speculation
doctrine: 1) protects the public's interest in this valuable resource; 2)
promotes maximum utilization of the State's limited water supply; 3)
protects other water users from unspecified injury; and 4) protects the
integrity of Colorado's water court system.
A. Given the Usufructuary Nature of Water Rights, a Change
Necessarily Requires Protection of the Public's Resource
The Colorado Constitution established a usufructuary system of water rights."°
Owners of water rights possess the right to use water in
priority but do not own the water itself."' A holder of this priority right
can buy and sell it freely and, in this sense, the right is considered a
real property interest.
Colorado's constitution dedicates all unappropriated water in the
natural streams of the state "to the use of the people," the ownership
thereof being vested in "the public." The same instrument guaranties
in the strongest terms the right of diversion and appropriation for
"beneficial uses.""' Because the constitution reserves all water for the
benefit of the public, it implicitly contemplates perpetual beneficial
use. Just as beneficial use is critical to the establishment of a water
right, continued beneficial use is necessary for continued existence of
the water right. If a water right holder ceases to use the water right for
an extended period of time, the court considers that water abandoned."2 To ensure protection of the public resource in a change of
water rights case, the applicant must demonstrate intent to place the
changed water right to actual beneficial use.""
B. Applying the Anti-Speculation Doctrine to Changes of Water Rights
Promotes Maximum Utilization of the Public Resource
One major objective of the prior appropriation system developed
under Article XVI, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution is to pro-

109. ISG, LLC v. Ark. Valley Ditch Ass'n, 120 P.3d 724, 732 (Colo. 2005) (quoting
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-102 (2005)).
110. Navajo Dev. Co., Inc. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982).
111. Wheeler v. N. Colo. Irrigating Co., 17 P. 487, 489 (Colo. 1888) (quoting COLO.
CONsT. art. XVI, § 5).
112. Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 553 (Colo. 2000).
113. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo.
1999).
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mote maximum utilization of the public's water within the state."4 The
right to use water does not give the owner the right to waste it."' The
prior appropriation system developed based upon an understanding
that Colorado waters are a "scarce and valuable resource.""' Accordingly, the prior appropriation system seeks to maximize use of such
limited resources by guaranteeing a right of diversion only to those
who will place the diverted water to beneficial use."7 Hoarding water
for unspecified future uses is anathema to the principle of maximum
utilization.'18
The court has recognized the common purposes served by applying the principles of maximum utilization and anti-speculation (along
with avoiding injury to other water rights) in change of use cases."'
The anti-speculation doctrine assumes maximum utilization, as opposed
to maximum marketing, of water resources. Changes of water rights
are subject to limitation, including historic use of the water, protection
against injury to other water users, and new appropriation to actual
beneficial use, all of which advance "the fundamental principles of
Colorado and western water law that favor optimum use, efficient water
management, and priority administration, and disfavor speculation and
waste.' ' 12 0 Application of the anti-speculation doctrine to change cases,

as well as to new appropriations, supports the maximum utilization
principle rooted in the desire to ensure continued use of water.
C. An Applicant for a Change of Water Rights Must Demonstrate a
Lack of Injury to Other Water Rights as Part of its PrimaFacie Case
In a change proceeding, the applicant bears the initial burden of
demonstrating a lack of injury to other water rights users.'' If, in light
of the undisputed facts, the applicant cannot meet that burden, the
water court need not waste judicial resources on a meaningless trial,
but should enter summary judgment dismissing the application. When
an applicant proposes speculative changes to a water right, the uncertainty surrounding any plan or intent for use undermines any showing
of non-injury and compels dismissal of the speculative claims. For instance, High Plains' applications did not contain statements of the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
2001).
119.
1999).
120.
121.

Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo.1968).
Id.
In reBd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952, 962 (Colo.1995).
See Fellhauer,447 P.2d at 994.
See id.; Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo.
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo.
Id. (emphasis added).
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proposed changes sufficient to allow the water court to assess the potential for injury to other water rights users, much less the nature of
such injury or terms and conditions to prevent the injury. High Plains'
applications contained no indication of the end users, the actual end
uses, or specific places of use for the proposed changes. Instead, the
opposition and the water court were left to guess at the specific details
of the proposed changed uses and to evaluate the potential for injury
based on theoretical end uses and locations.
Moreover, adjudication of speculative changes, such as those
sought by High Plains, would render the water courts and much of
Colorado water law superfluous. A change decree authorizing any use
in virtually any undefined location within eastern Colorado, as proposed in High Plains' applications, would allow perpetual changes of
use and place of use without ever returning to water court to requantify the water's historic use or prove that subsequent changes
would not result in injury to others. The potential ability to randomly
move water between disparate uses and places of use afforded by such
broad and undefined changes to water rights make satisfaction of the
injury inquiry impossible.
High Plains argued that consideration of such future changes
amongst the approved uses would be appropriate for post-decree review under the water court's retained jurisdiction. However, retained
jurisdiction simply provides a reality check, after entry of a change decree, against the forecasted conditions supporting the change decree.
Retained jurisdiction does not authorize indefinite continuation of a
change application. The applicant must adjudicate its change to a final decree and must demonstrate, as part of its primafaciecase, that the
proposed changes will not injure any other water use. While every decision of a water judge pertaining to a change of water rights is subject
to reconsideration for a limited period of time, a threshold showing of
non-injury is still necessary.'" Upon failing that inquiry, retained jurisdiction becomes a moot point.
Also, prior to determining a period of time for retained jurisdiction, the water judge must make specific findings and conclusions including the proposed future use of the water rights involved. 2 ' Broad
and speculative proposed changes, such as those presented by High
Plains, lack sufficient factual detail to allow water judges to make findings of specific use, or whether such uses would injure other water
rights holders. Additionally, without a well defined change, water
courts cannot estimate the time frame for implementation of any particular changed use, frustrating the court's ability to set a specific period of time for retained jurisdiction. In other words, water courts lack
both the authority and the practical ability to cure speculative changes
122.
123.

§ 37-92-304(6).
Id
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through retained jurisdiction. These limitations further support the
applicability of the anti-speculation doctrine to applications for
changes to water rights.
D. Allowing the Speculative Applications to Proceed Would Place an
Unnecessary Burden on Colorado's Water Court System
Colorado's water court system is focused on providing water users
with the opportunity to protect their water rights by participation in
the adjudication of water rights and changes thereof. While this promotes cooperation between water users, it can be a time-consuming
and expensive process. The issue in High Plains was not, as High
Plains asserted, whether private investors may adjudicate or change
water rights while developing water projects, but whether they first
must enter into contracts assuring the end use of the water rights. As
with a new appropriation, Colorado's twin policy goals of antispeculation and maximum utilization require that applicants secure an
end use before demanding the attention of the court and interested
parties for legal proceedings to authorize or confirm changes to water
rights. Changes as expansive as those proposed in High Plains' applications do not fit within this system, as they force the state and water
users to expend thousands (if not millions) of dollars debating the
merits of a nebulous project with an uncertain future. When an applicant lacks any specific plan for use, as in High Plains, the matter is not
ripe for litigation, and the applicant cannot demand the attention of
the courts or others.
1. Without a Specific Plan for a Changed Use, High Plains' Proposal
Was Not Ripe for Adjudication 2 '
Courts invoke the ripeness doctrine to ensure they do not render
an advisory opinion. The analysis is based on both constitutional "case
or controversy" requirements and prudential policies.'25 Ripeness requires an actual case or controversy between the parties "sufficiently
immediate and real so as to warrant adjudication."'" In other words,
courts will refuse to issue a decision based on speculative, hypothetical
or contingent facts."n Generally, a matter is not ripe for adjudication

124.

While not addressed in the High Plains decision, this issue was raised in the

brief submitted by the Board of Water Works, Pueblo, Colorado; Colorado Springs
Utilities; Lake Henry and Lake Meredith Reservoir Companies; and the Colorado Canal Company, and written by Carlson, Hammond & Paddock, LLC.
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when future contingencies might make litigation unnecessary. The
basic rationale of the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in disagreements over purely abstract or hypothetical issues."
In Utah International,Inc. v. Board of Land Commissioners, a mining
company sought review of the approval by the Board of Land Commissioners for a railroad right of way across certain state owned lands."n
Utah International ("Utah") retained mineral rights in the state owned
lands, and challenged the approval of the right of way because it did
not contain a relocation clause that would compel the railroad company to relocate the railroad if Utah began mining operations. ' The
court found the matter was unripe because Utah "based its action on a
hypothetical conflict which might arise in the future.'' An actual conflict might arise should Utah decide to exercise its mineral rights. Until that time, however, the case was unripe for decision. 2
Similarly,
zoning challenges commenced prior to submission of a definite plan
have been defeated on ripeness grounds because they require court to
"speculate as to what potential uses may be lurking in the hopes of the
33
property owner and in the minds of developers and city planners."
Like otherjudicial proceedings based on hypothetical conjecture, a
speculative change application requires the court and objectors to
speculate as to how the water will, in fact, be used. Even if High Plains
eventually sold water to a municipal user, as it proposed, the new owners would never implement many of the claimed uses. The water court
and the opposition would have spent extensive time and money creating terms and conditions for uses that would never occur, thus rendering an advisory opinion on numerous potential changes. The purpose
of the ripeness doctrine is to avoid such a needless expenditure of time
and money.TM Accordingly, the ripeness doctrine dictates sufficient
detail in proposed changes to ensure a reasonable likelihood of use of
the water as contemplated by the changes.

(Colo. 2004) ("In the interest of judicial efficiency, courts will not consider 'uncertain
or contingent future matters' because the injury is speculative and may never occur").
128. Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) overruled on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1977).
129. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 579 P.2d 96,97 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 98.
132. Id.
133. Amwest Invs., Ltd. v. City of Aurora, 701 F.Supp. 1508, 1514 (D.Colo. 1988)
(quoting Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1987)).
134. See 13A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.1 (2d. ed. 1984).
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2. Without a Definite Location of Use, it is Impossible to Determine
which Water Users May be Injured by the Proposed Changes, Possibly
Violating Those Users' Due Process Rights '
Similarly, when a change of water rights application is overly broad,
it may not provide sufficient notice of the proposed changes of water
rights to comply with constitutional notice requirements. As the court
has explained in the context of the adjudication of water rights,
the constitutional sufficiency of the content of a notice to interested
parties must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the
case. The court's inquiry must focus on the reasonableness of the notice, giving due regard to the subject with which
the statute deals and
36
the practicalities and peculiarities of the case.
To invoke the jurisdiction of the water court, a person seeking to
change the use of a water right must file an application with the water
court. 7 The water court, instead of serving potential objectors, includes the application in a monthly resume of all applications published in local newspapers of general circulation and mailed to any
person so requesting." Any person opposing the application may then
file a statement of opposition.'3 This resume notice provision supplants traditional personal service, but, so long as the resume provides
sufficient information, it satisfies the constitutional notion of due
process."

In contrast to High Plains' applications, constitutionally sufficient
resume notices provide interested parties reasonable information under the circumstances "to enable them to identify the issues on which a
decision may turn."' Considering the resume notice procedures for
water court cases, such notice must provide potentially interested parties with enough information to analyze the potential for injury and to
enable the person to decide whether to "acquiesce or contest" the application. '
Similarly, change applicants generally seek to use water within a localized area for specific purposes. For example, in Closed Basin Land135. While not addressed in the High Plains Decision, this issue was raised in the
brief submitted by the Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District and written
by Trout, Witwer and Freeman, P.C.
136. Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n. v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734
P.2d 627, 633 (Colo. 1987).
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(1) (a) (2005).
138. § 37-92-302(3)(b).
139. § 37-92-302(1)(b).
140. Closed Basin, 734 P.2d at 633.
141. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126 n.22 (1991).
142. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1949) (holding due process includes the right to notice and opportunity to be heard).
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owners Association v. Rio Grande Water Conservation District, the applicant
sought to implement a specific congressionally-authorized federal reclamation project.4 ' In contrast, High Plains failed to provide meaningful information to interested parties about the type or place of use of
the water rights, information central to the issue of injury. Arguably,
High Plains provided insufficient notice to potentially interested parties by failing to provide sufficient information to analyze whether to
oppose the application based on the possibility of injury.
Applying the anti-speculation doctrine to change cases avoids concern over whether the resume notice is sufficient to satisfy constitutional notice of due process. Without this application of the antispeculation doctrine, there could be a question as to whether the notice of type and location of use were specific enough to allow a potentially interested party to determine whether the change would injure
his water rights. With the court's affirmation that all applicants must
state both the type and the location of use with reasonable specificity,
notice of any non-speculative change of use likely satisfies all due process requirements.
IV. FUTURE CHANGES OF WATER RIGHTS MUST COMPLY
WITH THE ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE
High Plains is a private company that sought change decrees for
water rights that historically irrigated agricultural lands in the lower
Arkansas River valley. They requested a decree permitting any use of
the water at virtually any location in eastern Colorado. High Plains
could not identify a single end user, location of use or beneficial use of
the water pursuant to the proposed changes. The only possible purpose for the applications was to facilitate future sale of the water rights
to currently unidentified end users. The High Plainsdecision confirms
water courts cannot entertain such open-ended applications for
changes of water rights. Rather, change applications must identify actual plans for use of the water as changed. This not only conforms to
historical precedent seeking to ensure that all water is beneficially
used, but numerous tenets of Colorado water law also support this
precedent.
Given the increasing demand for a limited supply of water, the antispeculation doctrine will increasingly come into play in changes of water rights. Early settlers recognized the importance of ensuring continued beneficial use of Colorado's most valuable natural resource.
While demand has changed, concern for continued beneficial use of
the public resource, and a functional system for assuring and managing that use, remains as important as ever. Had the court determined
the anti-speculation doctrine did not apply to changes of water rights,
143.
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Colorado's prior appropriation system would become an incomprehensible and unreliable jumble of ill-defined and unmanageable decrees authorizing every changing use without notice or review.
In the coming years, law makers and courts will have to answer
more difficult questions about application of the anti-speculation doctrine to changes to water rights. Important questions likely will come
from ""partly speculative" change applications and unrealized changes.
For instance, to what extent can an applicant change the rights if the
applicant has a contract with an end user that will use some but not all
of the water rights for which the change is sought? Another difficult
question arises in applications proposing changes to more uses than
the applicant has actual plans for (such as "all beneficial uses"). Must
change decrees limit new beneficial uses to only those specific uses for
which the applicant can demonstrate an actual plan and intent to the
water court?
Conditional water rights can become speculative over time, and
courts may terminate them pursuant to the can and will statute.'" Can
decreed changes to absolute water rights become speculative over
time? For instance, an applicant could obtain a change based on a
supply contract with a special district formed to supply water to a new
subdivision. Shortly after the special district obtains a decree allowing
domestic use of the water, the developer becomes bankrupt, never
builds the development and the special district dissolves. If the right
was absolute, the can and will statute would not apply, but can the
court read the Colorado Constitution, appropriation statutes and prior
case law broadly enough to allow termination, or partial termination,
of the change decree upon a "can and will" analysis?
Existing principles of Colorado water law will guide the answers to
these and other questions. In particular, the basic concepts of "water
right," "appropriation" and "beneficial use" surely will direct future
Colorado Supreme Court decisions, as they did in High Plains. Those
concepts clearly limit the amount of water that can be changed, the
scope of the change and the continuing viability of any water right, and
will continue to be fundamental principles of Colorado water law.

144. Mun. Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY, 990 P. 2d 701, 709
(Colo. 1999).

